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Editorial on the Research Topic
Cognition During Sleep: Hyperassociativity, Associativity and New Connections
The purpose of this collection was to collate evidence and emerging ideas from the neurosciences,
cognitive sciences, and consciousness studies to understand the nature of cognition in sleep. In
particular, within the literature on dreaming, cognitive processes of “hyperassociativity,” or “loose
connections,” have been suggested to be a key feature of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep and
dreaming. Hyperassociativity has been ill-defined, though it seems to comprise diffuse, surprising
or weakly-linked memories or memory fragments, which are activated either sequentially or in
parallel during a dream. Recent scholars have proposed that hyperassociativity may create the
environment in which novel insights, new solutions and creativity can flourish and may therefore
underpin some of the cognitive benefits of REM sleep. REM dreaming, in particular, may have
evolved to spot non-obvious, remote associations which, coalesce to visualize probabilistic patterns
in past events.
The papers within this Research Topic explored and considered cognition during sleep from
several angles.
Nordin and Bjälkebring(a) sparked a debate within the issue concerning the nature of cognition
within REM sleep, as contextualized as the supernatural agent (a facet of self) in dreams, with Sears
responding with a critical dismissal of the underpinning theory, and the original authors [Nordin
and Bjälkebring(b)] responding again. The debate concerned the nature of counterintuitiveness
in dream imagery, what such cognitive structures could represent and how it could be measured.
Whilst the original authors [Nordin and Bjälkebring(a)] made use of a coding scheme devised by
Barrett (2008) for the first time, Sears raised somemethodological and conceptual criticisms of this.
The debate highlighted the need for further clarity surrounding measures of dreaming cognition,
as well as the range of approaches to studying it within dream science.
Barcaro et al. illustrated the complexity of cognition underlying consciousness in terms of
dream formation and possible purpose, with three dreams. They considered the parallel processes
involved with hyperassociativity, i.e., the simultaneous activation and combination of several
memory sources, along with the activation—or perhaps even suspension of—present concerns (as
such concerns seem to motivate the dreamer toward reducing the negative emotionality associated
with those experiences). However, such complex parallel processes lead to an apparently serial
presentation of dream images within the dream scenario. The authors must be congratulated
for synthesizing theories of consciousness and cognition as a means of accounting for dream
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formation. We suggest that hyperassociativity allows for the
presentation of these numerous memory sources in dreams, or
sleeping cognition, potentially reconciling these models.
Hołda et al. explored the effect of a 90-min nap, relative
to comparable wakefulness, of problem solving using a real-
world task featuring the presentation of a crime story via an
interactive computer task. Sleep architecture revealed that all
participants experienced REM as well as all non-REM stages.
Contrary to expectations, no effect of sleep on problem solving
was found. Neither quality nor creativity of the solutions
generated by the participants was higher in the nap group than
in the waking group, though naps only lasted around an hour
on average.
Similarly Solomonova et al. did not identify global benefits
of sleep on cognitive outcomes (in this case a procedural
memory consolidation task), but rather, a more nuanced one.
They compared meditation practitioners with non-meditating
controls on both the memory outcomes and sleep architecture.
Whilst architecture was comparable overall, task performance
correlated with spindle activity in the meditation group,
but with REM in the control group. The authors speculate
that meditation may alter sleep architecture in response
to learning and memory, which indicates possible learned
mechanisms for reorganizing neural architecture. The possibly
more dynamic, rather than fixed, nature of cognition during sleep
is therefore suggested.
Fogel et al. also investigated relationships between sleep
and learning by exploring dream content in response to
recent prior learning, as mediated by inter-individual reasoning
(for early dreams) and verbal abilities (for later dreams).
Dreams reported from early in the night reflected the
extent of learning within the reasoning task. In that way
the findings demonstrated possible links between dream
production and manifestation, and specific cognitive styles
during wake.
Vallat et al. explored group trait differences in dream
recall. They demonstrated that medial prefrontal cortex white
matter density was greater in high dream recallers compared
to low dream recallers. Whether the anatomical differences
result from learning or are congenital, we cannot say, however
accumulated evidence indicates the importance of the medial
prefrontal cortex in dream recall—or perhaps dream production.
The more evidence we can accumulate concerning the neural
substrates underlying dreaming, the better we may be able to
make inferences about the large-scale function of dreaming,
particularly in relation to memory- or emotion-processing.
Continuing this exploration of traits, Blagrove et al.
considered both state and trait empathy as related to dream
sharing. Trait empathy was found to be significantly associated
with the frequency of listening to the dreams of others, frequency
of telling one’s own dreams to others, and attitude toward
dreams. In a second study, dream sharing increased state
empathy, leading the authors to suggest that these relationships
between dreaming and sharing of experiences may afford us
the opportunity to use dreams to facilitate social bonding.
In this way, the sleep mentation may be functional. It may
also be open to change or distortion, reiterating Solomonova
et al.’s sentiments above that sleeping cognition may not
be fixed.
Kahn explored continuity in terms of the self and noted
that the cognitive reactions to activity during sleep, in the
context of dream activity, was somewhat discontinuous with
waking life but continuous with the dream activity, such that
dream content was bizarre by waking standards, but it was
largely accepted during the dream. Kahn gives examples of
dream content whereby there are changes in situations, or
hyperassociativity of places and times, but that these are accepted
by the dream-self. Thus, hyperassociative cognition during
sleep seems to be a “normal” part of activity at that time.
This acceptance may also hint at the function (or functions)
of hyperassociativity.”
Rozen and Soffer-Dudek investigated the physiological and
psychological correlates of a specific yet common dream event:
that of teeth falling out, in an attempt to explore the continuity
hypothesis. Teeth dreams were associated with specific measures
of current dental distress and irritation, whereas other (non-
teeth dreams) were not associated with such dental distress.
Whilst this does not support the continuity hypothesis in terms
of memories, or recent events, being reactivated during sleep
and consequently manifesting in dreams, it does support the
continuity of perceptions and concerns, whilst going against
the more symbolic notions that teeth dreams may be a
representation of something non-physiological. This clear and
helpful illustration of a specific dream theme has helped to
elucidate some of the more universal cognitive mechanisms
underlying dream production.
Taken together, this collection has explored the
cognitive correlates of sleep and dreaming, articulating
the apparently more universal nature of hyperassociativity
for the first time. We propose that identifying cognitive
features of sleep over the course of the night may provide
insights as to sleep’s function, whilst recognizing the
challenges of studying dreams more subjectively. We
suggest that hyperassociativity be studied further, with
particular reference to the nature of the links between
memory sources being identified over the course of
the night.
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